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Abstract
In this paper, we revisit the 2009-2012 episode in which Ofgem imposed a non-discrimina-
tion clause on large retailers in the UK energy market. The Standard Licence Condition
25A (SLC 25A) was introduced to prevent suppliers from charging their incumbent cus-
tomers higher prices than their out-of-area customers. The SLC 25A included a “sunset
clause”, to allow the condition to lapse three years after its implementation. Several IO
economists protested that the prohibition of spatial price discrimination would eventu-
ally lead to competition weakening. At the end of the three-year period, Ofgem decided
not to renew SLC 25A for any period. To further our understanding of Ofgem’s motives
and its opponents’ arguments, we build a model where two local monopolists compete
on a third market. We determine conditions where the obligation to set the same price
in and out of the local market can result in a better or a worse situation for consumers.
We show that even when the ban on price discrimination weakens competition, the
average consumer can be better off.
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1 Introduction
Starting in the Thatcherian era, the liberalization of the UK energy industry was sup-
posed to be accomplished by opening the retail market entirely to competition, including
for residential consumers, in 1999. Yet, fifteen years later, Ofgem (Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets), the industry regulator, seemed highly dissatisfied with the way
retailers were behaving, especially with regard to the pricing schemes they applied. In
June 2014, Ofgem referred the retail energy market to the Competition and Market Au-
thority (CMA)1 for full investigation, with a view to making the market simpler, clearer
and fairer, to encouraging more new entrants, and to increasing competitive pressure
on prices. The CMA report, published in June 2016, proposes a series of remedies to
the adverse effects to competition identified in the gas and electricity retail markets.2
The CMA enquiry follows a series of unsuccessful attempts by Ofgem to improve
competition by restricting retailers’ freedom.3 This paper focusses on one of these regu-
lations, the non-discrimination condition between regions (Standard Licence Conditions
SLC 25A). This regulation was implemented in September 2009 for a three-year test
period and withdrawn in 2012, primarily because of a campaign by economists and
practitionners opposing it on the grounds of anticompetitive effects.4
The Industrial Organization literature does not provide clear-cut answers about the
effects of a ban on price discrimination. Knowing whether price differentials are harmful
for consumers and welfare actually depends on the degree of discrimination, the cost of
switching from the current supplier to a new one, and the structure of demand and sup-
ply in the markets under scrutiny. In his literature review, Armstrong (2006) notes that:
“price discrimination exists when two similar products which have the same marginal
cost to produce are sold by a firm at different prices”. In the case we are considering
in this paper, namely a combination of spatial and behavioral differentiation of energy
consumers, neither products nor consumers are entirely similar. Price discrimination
can therefore not simply be assessed on the fact that energy prices vary among regions.
But how to judge a 10% difference? And even if discrimination is established, should it
be condemned?
The degree of competition plays an important role in assessing the effects of price
differences. In the monopoly case, using price discrimination cannot be bad for the firm,
except in a dynamical framework where the seller cannot commit to a freeze on future
rebates (e.g. Dobson and Waterson, 2005). On the buyers’ side, Thisse and Vives (1988)
show that there is no such clear-cut statement since some consumers may be better off
1From 1 April 2014, CMA took over most of the functions of the Competition Commission (CC) and
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT).
2The final report is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5773de34e5274a0da3000113/final-
report-energy-market-investigation.pdf
3Littlechild (2014) and Pollitt and Haney (2014) provide a summary of the Ofgem’s interventions in
energy retail.
4One of the most virulent opponents to Ofgem’s interventions in the retail segment is Stephen
Littlechild (2012) who was Director General of Electricity Supply and Head of the Office of Electricity
Regulation (Offer) during the period 1989-1998. After merging with the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas),
Offer became Ofgem in 2000.
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while others may be worse off.
In the oligopoly case, it is even more difficult to state whether allowing price dis-
crimination will harm consumers as it changes the nature of competition by extending
the set of strategic tools.5 Thisse and Vives (1988) analyze price discrimination in an
oligopolistic market structure where firms play strategically. Using a Hotelling model
with two firms, they assess alternatively simultaneous and sequential price choices. In
the simultaneous case, firms always choose to price discriminate as long as the com-
peting market (i.e. consumers that are in the subset common to the delivery zones of
the two firms) is large enough. In the sequential case, when each firm can commit to
a pricing policy, price discrimination is a dominant strategy because it allows firms to
respond better to any strategy of the rival. However, Thisse and Vives show that, when
firms choose price discrimination, it may result in lower profits. In other words, in some
circumstances, a ban on price discrimination may protect sellers from rivals’ assaults.6
Corts (1998) finds that the effect of discrimination on prices depends on the firms’
judgment on markets, i.e. whether they consider that a particular market is strong or
weak. In a two-market framework, consumers belonging to a “strong” market are more
captive than those of the “weak” market. Therefore, the strong (resp. weak) market
is the one where firms want to charge a higher (resp. lower) price compared to the
case of uniform pricing. When strong and weak markets are the same for both firms
(“best-response symmetry”), the price rises in the strong market and falls in the weak
market due to an increase in competition. By contrast, if firms disagree on the market
evaluation (“best-response asymmetry”), all prices may fall and firms would prefer to
commit to any form of non-discrimination.
Cooper et al. (2005) examine the antitrust implications of the former analysis. They
argue that the perfect competition case used by antitrust authorities as the optimal mar-
ket structure is a theoretical, and in some way imaginary, case. If perfect competition
is the benchmark, price discrimination is an evidence of market power. Actually, in
real-world markets, products are not perfect substitutes because of some form of differ-
entiation. Even if this differentiation allows firms to charge different prices to different
consumers, it does not mean that it hampers the market’s competitiveness. As Levine
(2002) writes, ”price discrimination alone is not evidence of market power and should
not be used to justify regulatory intervention”.
Price discrimination can also be implemented thanks to indirect means. Bester and
Petrakis (1996) study oligopolistic competition thanks to rebate and coupons. In their
paper, consumers differ due to their location or brand loyalty. For instance, retailers
may use couponing to attract rivals’ customers. In this case, coupons or rebates are
used to compensate for ”transportation costs”, i.e. to modify consumers’ preferences in
the horizontal differentiation space, then to increase the retailer’s market share.
Our analysis is based on both spatial and behavioral differentiation which allows to
replicate the retail electricity market where each supplier benefits from the loyalty of its
5Corts (1998) provides a good summary of the main studies in competitive price discrimination.
6“Denying a firm the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory basis provides the
latter with some protection against price attacks.” Thisse and Vives (1988) p. 134.
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historical consumers and only competes against the other sellers for versatile customers.
This framework differs from the Cort’s two-market framework because, even in the
duopoly case, the British retail market comprises at least three markets: two inert
markets composed by historical captive customers and a dynamic market composed of
active consumers in which retailers compete. We also address an institutional question:
should ex ante regulation be favored to constrain pricing strategies in the retail market or
should this be the exclusive task of the competition authority checking ex post whether
retailers abuse their dominant position?
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we present the UK energy
retail market and the attempt by Ofgem to constrain sellers’ pricing strategies. The
second section provides a basic model of price competition in a framework that reflects
the main features of the UKmarket. We show that, even in a drastically simplified model
where competition is severely harmed by a non-discrimination clause that provokes a
competitor’s exit, it is very difficult to know ex ante whether price discrimination is
good or bad for consumers. We then explain why, even though it appeared ex post that
Ofgem was wrong with regard to its non-discrimination condition, it was right ex ante
in checking the consequences of a ban accompanied by a sunset clause. It maybe was not
the initial Ofgems’s motivation, but SLC 25A should be viewed as a social experiment.
2 Pricing on the British retail market for energy
To understand Ofgem’s offensive against the big energy retailers’ pricing policy, we first
consider the state of the industry and its history. We then explain the arguments used
by Ofgem to identify anti-competitive practices and to apply price control remedies.
Finally, we introduce the counter-arguments of the opponents of the price regulation
that was implemented.
2.1 The Six Large Energy Firms
The retail market for gas and electricity is dominated by six firms, often referred to
as the Big 6, that share over 90% of the domestic market: British Gas, EDF Energy,
npower, E.ON UK, Scottish Power, and SSE. These companies are the heirs of the 12
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) created in 1988 by the reorganization of the
nation-wide Central Electricity Generating Board and the Area Boards that purchased
electricity (almost all of it from the CEGB) and distributed and sold it to customers
within their designated areas.
As the market was deregulated, firms considered it more secure and profitable to
integrate production and supply activities vertically through a series of mergers. The
partial or total acquisition of RECs by power generators gave them supply capability.
The result of a long series of take-overs and mergers (initiated by American utilities,
then completed by French, German and Spanish utilities) is an oligopoly consisting of
six producers/retailers, each with medium market power at the national level. Figure 1
shows that in the nation-wide electricity retail business, each big firm has a 10 to 25%
market share, whereas together, small suppliers hardly reach 5%.
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Figure 1: Domestic electricity supply market shares.
Source: Ofgem (2014), “State of the Market Assessment”.
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Figure 2: Dominant regional suppliers.
Source: www.ecotricity.co.uk/for-your-home/check-our-prices/your-regional-supplier
Electricity being a very homogeneous product, and given that “two is enough”,
one would expect strong competition, resulting in low margins with prices more or less
uniform across the UK. Actually, competition does not work as it should. This is because
each of the Big 6 remains dominant in its historical selling zone, as shown in Figure
2 (except for British gas).7 Ofgem “observed differences in prices between different
domestic customer groups” (“State of the Market Assessment” p. 10, 27 March 2014).
In particular, “Customers on single fuel tariffs with their legacy supplier are likely to be
paying higher prices than those who have switched to another supplier, either to single
or dual fuel tariffs.” (ibid.).
If a significant minority of consumers remain with their legacy supplier, competition
is only for the others, and differential pricing is a natural outcome. But Ofgem does
not like this outcome and has tried repeatedly to change it. The next section presents
one of these attempts.
7The map in Figure 2 is from the website of ecotricity, one of the small suppliers that compete against
the six large energy firms: ”When the electricity supply industry was de-regulated in 1990 all the regional
electricity companies — collectively known as the electricity board — were privatised. This move split
the UK into 14 regions with a different electricity company for each. We use these regions as the basis
for our prices — and for many we now undercut the standard tariffs of the Big Six energy companies in
those regions.” www.ecotricity.co.uk/for-your-home/check-our-prices/your-regional-supplier
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2.2 Ofgem and the economists
2.2.1 Ofgem attacks
In “Energy Supply Probe - Initial Findings Report” (6 October 2008), pp. 8-9, Ofgem
expressed concern as regards differential pricing. In particular, “Until very recently, the
five former incumbent electricity suppliers charged electricity customers in their former
monopoly areas an average of over 10 per cent higher prices than comparable ’out-of-
area’ customers. (...) Based on data provided to us by the companies, we can find no cost
basis for this premium, nor are similar premiums found in gas.8 [...] Overall, these price
differentials mean that companies charge more to existing (“sticky”) customers whilst
maintaining competitiveness in more price sensitive segments of the market. The ability
to price differentially in this way means that pressure on prices in the most competitive
segments of the market does not always constrain prices for all other consumers. There
is evidence in the companies’ business plans and from interviews with the Big 6 that they
are aware of these dynamics and take them into account in their pricing decisions.”
Ofgem therefore considered placing a new condition in the licenses of the large
suppliers that would either impose a prohibition on price discrimination or introduce a
form of relative price control. To address “undue discrimination”, it eventually decided
to impose a license condition on energy suppliers, that would limit the differences in
the tariffs they could charge their ‘in-area’ customers compared with their ‘out-of-area’
customers. This was the standard license condition SLC 25A, starting September 1,
2009. The condition included a three-year sunset clause, to allow it to lapse three years
after its implementation.9 Coming from an entity in charge of citizens’ welfare, we can
imagine that the expected outcome of this regulation was a price decrease and/or a
surplus increase for ‘in-area’ customers at a low cost for the others.
2.2.2 The economists’ campaign
The SLC 25A (like others of the same kind) has been strongly criticized, both by
Ofgem’s members and non-members. S. Littlechild has synthetized the views of several
economists experts in energy economics :10
8Ofgem also explains that a number of the price differentials between payment types do not appear
to have a cost justification, particularly for those customers who pay by standard credit. Another
complaint is that suppliers compete vigorously in the online market with heavily discounted offers, the
cheapest of which may be below cost.
In our paper, we focus on the spatial pricing dimension, even though the other two problems (payment
mode and internet contact) can be interpreted using the same type of IO model.
9See the text at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2012/02/undue discrimination consultation.pdf.
Also see “Guidelines on Cost Reflectivity between Payment Methods and the Pro-
hibition of Undue Discrimination in Domestic Gas and Electricity Supply Con-
tracts”, 7 August 2009, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/85032/2-19-
guidelinesoncostreflectivityandunduediscriminationinsupply.pdf
10The Littlechild′s opinion is now detailed in Littlechild (2014). The main arguments he pre-
sented during the period 2009-2012 to criticize the non-discrimination clause are summarized in
http://www.iea.org.uk/blog/ofgem-and-the-philosophers-stone.
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“All these proposals are based on an elementary economic fallacy: the assumption
that the range of tariffs available in a competitive market would remain unchanged if
new obligations of the kinds proposed were introduced.”
In the same vein, Hviid and Waddams Price (2010) wrote: “The most likely net
result of prohibiting geographical discrimination on prices is to raise them all.”
How could the economists be so sure about the negative consequences of SLC 25A
whereas the economic literature is very cautious as regards the effects of price discrim-
ination in an oligopolistic environment? There are basically three explanations:
• First, the numerous documents and reports published by Ofgem reveal hesitations
as to the expected effects of price constraints on competition and fairness. So, if
the regulator itself is not fully convinced that its policy is pro-competitive, when it
actually has a statutory duty to care about consumers’ well-being, one can suspect
that it over-reacts by intervening just to show it is doing something.
• Second, being experts of the electricity industry with a deep knowledge of the
mechanisms of oligopolistic competition, the British economists may indeed have
had the intuition, or even the conviction, that price discrimination was evidence
that competition was at work in an industry where the main obstacle was (and
remains) the cost of switching away from the current supplier.11 Consequently,
limiting the possibility to price discriminate just reduced the incentive to attract
new consumers by proposing them low prices.
• Third, the economic literature referred to by the economists’ group seemed to show
that SLC 25A could only have adverse effects on competition in energy retail. In
particular Corts (1998) uses a two firms−two markets model to analyze the re-
sults of price discrimination under competition. Hviid and Waddams Price (2010)
summarize Corts’ findings as follows: “If forced to treat markets the same, firms
will retrench to the markets where they make the most money. If firms retrench to
the same market (best-reply symmetry), they will start competing vigorously for
it and thereby drive prices down. If they retreat to different markets (best-reply
asymmetry), each will find itself facing less intense competitive restraint, will be
able to behave more like a monopolist, and raise their price.” In the UK energy
market, British Gas seems to have a neutral policy as regards regional pricing.
What about the other large suppliers? Since in each region there is one firm that
can raise profits more easily than the others (best-reply asymmetry), banning price
discrimination will push each electricity firm to retrench to its preferred market
and prices will mechanically go up.
The economists who wrote to Ofgem to express their negative opinion were Catherine Waddams Price,
George Yarrow (who resigned from the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority because of the Ofgem
decision) and John Vickers (a former director of the Office of Fair Trading).
11For a detailed analysis of the switching process, see Waddams et al. (2012).
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2.2.3 Ofgem surrenders
Ex post, it appeared that the Ofgem’s policy actually made the retail market less com-
petitive than it had been. Waddams Price and Zhu (2016) “find that the nature of
competition in the industry has changed, with less effective rivalry between the regional
incumbents and large regional competitors following the intervention; companies seem
to have ‘retreated’ to their home regions, leaving a market where pricing behaviour re-
sembles more closely a duopoly between British Gas and the regional incumbent.”
The non-discrimination provision expired on 31 July 2012. In advance of the expiry,
Ofgem issued a consultation on whether it was appropriate to retain the condition for a
further two year period. Following the consideration of responses to the consultation, the
Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (the governing authority of Ofgem) decided not
to renew SLC 25A for a further two-year period or for any other period.12 Apparently,
the latter decision was not clear enough since on 18 December 2014, Ofgem deemed it
necessary to send a letter to ‘Domestic suppliers, consumer representatives and other
interested parties’, reiterating that “Standard Condition 25A is no longer in effect. The
provision expired on 31 July 2012 and suppliers are not bound by it in any way. We
are not considering reintroducing such a licence condition, nor would this be appropriate
during the CMA’s investigation.”13
3 A model of price competition with spatial differentiation
Whether price discrimination is good or bad for competition and welfare is a difficult
question with no obvious answer. Using the tools of IO, we build an elementary model
of price competition with spatial and behavioral differentiation to highlight the pro and
anti-competitive consequences of a ban on price discrimination in a framework that
portrays the UK energy retail market but simple enough to provide insights.
Our modeling has some similarities with that of Bester and Petrakis (1996). They
use an address model where half the consumers are located at one end of a one-dimension
market with one seller, and the other half at the other end of the line with the second
seller. However, we consider that the English retail market can be understood only
with two firms and three markets. Indeed, there are three types of consumers: first, we
must distinguish between active and inactive households in terms of best-offer search.
Within the latter category, each consumer is “loyal” to its regional incumbent.14 In the
12Decision on Standard Condition 25A in the Gas and Electricity Supply Licences, 26
October 2012, www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/74952/decision-standard-condition-25a-gas-and-
electricity-supply-licences.pdf
13www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/92094/standardcondition25ainthegasandelectricitysupplylicences.pdf
The origin of the mess is probably that when Ofgem decided to allow the sunset clause to lapse,
it warned suppliers not to resume differential pricing. Some market participants have interpreted the
warning as a mandatory prohibition.
14In the summary of the final report on Energy Market investigation (June 2016), CMA explains
that it commissioned a survey of 7,000 domestic retail energy customers. The survey provides material
evidence of domestic customers’ lack of understanding of, and engagement in, retail energy markets.
For example, 36% of respondents either did not think it was possible or did not know if it was possible
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IO lingo, we can say that consumers are doubly differentiated: in terms of geographical
location and in terms of their ability or willingness to be active in the energy retail
market. This only results into three markets because those consumers who are active
intensively use the Internet, so that their location does not matter.
Thus, each firm is a monopolist on its local market and it competes against the other
on the market of active consumers. With only two markets a` la Corts, this double differ-
entiation cannot be featured. Our paper also has a strong connection with the analysis
of Dobson and Waterson (2005) who detail the pricing policy of retailers that operate
nationally or internationally but mainly compete on local markets. They show that for
a chain-store facing a mix of local duopoly and monopoly markets, practising geograph-
ical price discrimination is not always best. Our departure point is different since we
start from the case where discrimination is profitable and analyse the consequences of
a ban.
In the following section, we first present the hypotheses and notations of the model.
We then successively determine the price equilibrium in the case where pricing is free
and in the case where each firm must fix the same price in its local market and in
the competitive segment. We finally show that, even in this over-simplified framework,
despite a dramatic decrease in competition due to the monopolization of the active
market, one cannot predict whether banning price discrimination is good or bad for
consumers without a detailed knowledge of their willingness-to-pay in each market.
3.1 Hypotheses and notations
Our model allows to capture the a priori heterogeneous preferences of consumers in
the retail market. The differentiation model is the best way to illustrate the different
types of consumers: those who remain stuck to their historical retailer because they
would suffer a very high switching disutility, and those who can easily forage and seize
profitable opportunities.
We start from a situation where two suppliers face two categories of consumers: those
who have some knowledge and capacity to be reactive to different offers by competing
retailers and those who are not. The latter are stuck with their historical incumbent
supplier. Then the problem cannot be analysed in the Corts’ way with two sellers and
two markets. If we reduce the problem to two sellers, there are at least three markets:
two markets of inactive consumers linked to their respective incumbent supplier and a
to change one or more of the following: tariff; payment method; and supplier; 34% of respondents said
they had never considered switching supplier; 56% of respondents said they had never switched supplier,
did not know it was possible or did not know if they had done so; and 72% said they had never switched
tariff with an existing supplier, did not know it was possible, or did not know if they had done so.
Between about 20 and 30% of the domestic electricity customers of the six largest retailers have been
with their current supplier for more than ten years.
The competition authority concudes that the large retailers enjoy a position of unilateral market
power over their inactive customer base and have the ability to exploit such a position through pricing
their standard variable tariffs materially above a level that can be justified by cost differences from their
non-standard tariffs.
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set of versatile consumers ready to switch to the best offer 15
The three markets are:
• market a is the historical ground of firm a. Demand is given by the linear function
qa = a−
pa
2 .
• market b is the historical ground of firm b. Demand is given by the linear function
qb = b−
pb
2 where a ≥ b.
• market c is a versatile market where firms a and b can compete. All consumers have
the same willingness to pay c. They are uniformly distributed along a segment of
length 1. Firm a (resp. b) is installed at the left (resp. right) end of the segment.
The firms fix FOB prices and consumers have to pay the extra cost of ‘travelling’
towards their preferred supplier at a disutility of t per unit of distance, with t ≤ c.
A consumer who does not buy has a zero net utility.
In the case of active consumers who search new offers on the Internet, the search
cost in terms of the time spent and transaction costs induced by switching to a better
offer is close to zero; we will fix t = 0 in section 3.4. By contrast, because of large
switching costs, it is too costly for a (resp. b) to enter the local market served by b
(resp. a). Competition, if any, is limited to market c. Given the loyalty of consumers
in local markets, we can set that b > c.
Finally, retailers do not differ very much in terms of costs. They can buy energy
competitively on the wholesale market, or by contract, or use their own production
plants; additionnally, commercial expenditures are not very high. Consequently to
simplify notations, we normalize their costs by fixing them equal to 0.
3.2 The unconstrained equilibrium
Since 1999, in the UK energy retail industry all retailers are allowed to sell anywhere
within national boundaries. Then location should be irrelevant. Actually, location is a
relevant issue by a hysteresis effect: large retailers have inherited client portfolios from
former regional utilities. This gives them a kind of monopoly power on the most inactive
local customers, that is on a large majority of the portfolio (see the CMA report of June
2016). Only the active ones form the nationwide competitive market. This is why local
markets a and b are modelled as monopoly markets and market c as a differentiated
duopoly (that will be simplified in section 3.4 to take account of the homogeneity of
electricity).
15Waddams et al. (2014) present the observation of over a hundred thousand ‘real’ switching decisions
by participants in a collective switching exercise in 2012. They find that in this exercise, i) the probability
of switching rises with increases in the gains available; ii) despite substantial gains available and very
little further effort required to switch, only a third of participants switched supplier; iii) Participants
who saw two offers were less likely to switch than those who saw only one.
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3.2.1 Local markets
On market i (i = a, b), firm i is a monopolist. It solves maxpi piqi (pi) = pi

i− pi2

. We
can easily compute
• the monopoly price
pmi = i (1)
• the monopoly quantity
qmi =
i
2
(2)
• the monopolist’s profit
pmi q
m
i =
i2
2
(3)
• the global surplus
umi − cost = 2q
m
i

i−
qmi
2

− 0 =
3
4
i2 (4)
• the consumers’ surplus
umi − p
m
i q
m
i =
3
4
i2 −
i2
2
=
i2
4
(5)
3.2.2 The competitive market
The consumer located at distance x from the left end of the segment (where firm a is
installed) enjoys the net utility c−pa−tx if she buys one unit at a’s and c−pb−t (1− x)
if she buys at b’s. We assume that c is large enough so that all consumers can buy one
unit, even though only one firm is active.16
• To identify the constraint created by this requirement, suppose that only firm
a is active in market c. The marginal consumer is then located at x such that
c− pa − tx = 0, and since consumers are distributed uniformly with density 1, x
also is the quantity purchased at firm a. Hence, as long as x = c−pa
t
≤ 1 the best
choice of a is the solution to
max
pa
pa
c− pa
t
(6)
The resulting monopoly price is c2 , so that the marginal consumer is located at
c− c
2
t
= c2t . Since the consumer most remote from 0 (where firm a is installed) is
located at 1, to be sure that he will be served we assume that
c
2t
≥ 1 (7)
16In the UK, like in all developed countries, the rate of coverage is close to 100% for electricity
provision.
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Under this assumption, if let alone, the best choice of firm i is to fix
pcmi = c− t (8)
which gives it the whole market of size 1.
• When both firms are active, the marginal consumer is located at distance x such
that c−pa−tx = c−pb−t (1− x) . Because of the uniform distribution hypothesis,x is also the quantity purchased at firm a. Let us denote it by qa (pa, pb) = 12+ pb−pa2t
and, similarly, qb (pa, pb) = 12 + pa−pb2t .17
Solving for
max
pi
piqi (pi, pj) = pi1
2
+
pj − pi
2t

i = a, b j = a, b i = j (9)
we obtain the best response function of firm i, Ri (pj) =
t+pj
2 . From the Nash
equilibrium pNa = Ra

pNb

, pNb = Rb

pNa

we can deduce
• — the equilibrium duopoly prices
pNa = p
N
b = t (10)
— the duopoly quantities
qNa = q
N
b =
1
2
(11)
— the duopolists’ profit
pNi q
N
i =
t
2
, i = a, b (12)
— the global surplus
ucN = 2
 1
2
0
(c− tx) dx = 2

c
2
−
t
8

= c−
t
4
(13)
— the consumer’s surplus
2
 1
2
0
(c− tx)dx− 2piNqiN = c−
5
4
t (14)
Clearly, all profits in this market come from the differentiation index (cost of trans-
portation) t. If t = 0, we have Bertrand competition (price = zero marginal cost).
Keeping the hypothesis (7) , all consumers in market c are served and, the higher t is,
the lower the consumers’ surplus and global surplus, and the higher the profits and the
deadweight loss will be.
17Actually, qi (pi, pj) = min

1
2
+
pj−pi
2t
, 1

. We see that qi (pi, pj) = 1 if pj ≥ pi + t.
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3.3 No price discrimination
The regulator considers that price discrimination pmi = i > p
N
i = t is unfair for con-
sumers in market i. It imposes firm i to set the same price in its historical market where
demand is qi = i−
pi
2 and in the competitive market where demand is qi (pi, pj) = t+pj−pi2t .
If the two firms are active in market c, firm i solves
max
pi

i−
pi
2

pi +
t+ pj − pi
2t
pi i = a, b j = a, b i = j
From the FOC (i− pi)+
t+pj−2pi
2t = 0, we derive the best response function
	Ri (pj) =
2ti+t+pj
2(1+t) . The Nash equilibrium is defined by 	pNa = 	Ra 	pNb  , 	pNb = 	Rb 	pNa  . Solving for
the two best-response functions, we obtain the equilibrium non discriminatory prices in
the case of both a and b remaining active in market c.
	pNi = t× (3 + 2t) + 4 (1 + t) i+ 2j
4 (1 + t)2 − 1
i = a, b j = a, b i = j (15)
Unsurprisingly, the result is an increase in the prices on the competitive market as long
as the differentiation parameter t is not very large:
	pNi − pNi = t× 4 (i− t) (1 + t) + 2 (j − t)
4 (1 + t)2 − 1
> 0 i = a, b (16)
for i > t and j > t. Since t is rather small for active consumers, it can definitely be
expected that SLC 25A will push prices up in the active consumer market. Note that
the increase is not the same for the two firms if their home markets are different:
	pNa − 	pNb = t
4 (1 + t)2 − 1
(2 + 4t) (a− b) ≥ 0 (17)
If a > b, firm a increases its price more than firm b and loses a share of market c.
Concerning the inactive consumers, we have that
pmi − 	pNi = (3 + 2t) (i− t) + 2t (i− j)
4 (1 + t)2 − 1
(18)
We see that pma − 	pNa > 0 since a > b : the captive consumers of firm a benefit from
SLC 25A. As regards the captive consumers of firm b, the result is less sure. If the
difference a − b is not very large, again pmb − 	pNb > 0 and the captive consumers of b
are better off when discrimination is forbidden. But the opposite can occur if b is small
compared to a. We see from (17) that the larger the difference (a− b) is, the weaker
competition on market c will be. Firm b can then easily increase its non discriminatory
price, and if consumers on market b have a low willingness to pay, meaning that they
initially paid a low pmb , SLC 25A can result in a price increase in market b :
pmb ≶ 	pNb ⇐⇒ b ≶ t× 3 + 2 (t+ a)3 + 4t (19)
The model with three markets and two firms thus confirms that banning price dif-
ferentials has
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• a positive impact for inactive consumers who initially paid a high price (here
market a);
• a uncertain impact for inactive consumers who initially paid a low price (here
market b);
• a negative impact for active consumers (here market c).
One can easily conclude that the global result of this type of price regulation is hard
to predict without in-depth knowledge of the preference parameters of consumers in
each market. This uncertainty is reinforced by the possibility of one firm leaving the
competitive market to its competitor and retreating to its more profitable home market
where there is no pricing constraint. As seen in section 2.2.3, this is the main argument
used by the opponents to SLC 25A. To emphasize this uncertainty, we now consider the
extreme case of Bertrand competition in market c.
3.4 Fierce competition in the market of active consumers
3.4.1 Mixed and pure strategies
We can obtain a simple global view of the effects of the non-discrimination clause in the
case where t = 0. With a zero transaction cost, market c is a battlefield for Bertrand
competition.
a) Without the regulatory constraint on prices, from (10), we obtain pNi = 0. The
result is that the overall profit of firm i is derived exclusively from its local market:
pmi q
m
i =
i2
2
b) Under the obligation to fix the same price on markets i and c, firm i has two pure
strategies:
• b1) To quit market c, which guarantees pmi q
m
i =
i2
2 from its home market i;
b2) To stay in market c, with a profit that depends on the decision of its com-
petitor. If the competitor stays in, the price is given by (15) with t = 0,
that is 	pNi = 0, which means a nil global profit. If the competitor leaves
market c, from (8) firm i can at best set pcmi = c. The resulting profit is
(pcmi × 1) + p
cm
i

i−
pcmi
2

= c

1 + i− c2

. Then, if αj is the probability of
j leaving market c, the expected profit of i when staying in market c is
Ei = αjc

1 + i− c2

.
We see that firm i is indifferent between serving only market i at the local monopoly
price pmi = i or serving the two markets at the non-discriminatory price p
cm
i = c if
i2
2 = αjc

1 + i− c2

, that is if firm j exits market c with probability
αj =
i2
c (2 + 2i− c)
(20)
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Therefore, we can have an equilibrium in mixed strategies where each firm i, j = a, b,
i = j randomizes its decision to leave market c with probability given by (20) . To have
this type of equilibrium, it is necessary that
αj < 1 =⇒
i2
2
< c

1 + i−
c
2

i, j = a, b, i = j (21)
3.4.2 The effects of the no-discrimination clause
Based on the above result, we know how to obtain an equilibrium in pure strategies
where one firm (namely firm a) leaves the market of active consumers. It suffices to
assume that
a2
2
− ac > c

1−
c
2

>
b2
2
− bc (22)
Under this condition, firm a (resp. b) is better off (resp. worse off) when serving
only its local market.
This is a drastic case where price regulation changes the competitive market c into
a monopoly market. We will show that even when this adverse effect to competition
occurs, forbidding price discrimination can make consumers better off.
When these two inequalities are satisfied, the no-discrimination constraint has the
effects of
i) pushing firm a out of market c where firm b becomes a de facto monopolist
facing a (endogenous) price cap constraint;
ii) leaving the situation on market a unchanged;
iii) decreasing the price on market b from pmb = b to p
cm
b = c;
iv) increasing the price on market c from pbN = 0 to pcmb = c.
Effect iv) is not a surprise: active consumers are penalized. The decrease of the
price on market b in iii) was also expected as we started with b > c: inactive consumers
of market b are the winners. Effect ii) is the side effect of i). Effect i) is the worst
result for the regulator as monopolization is a visible structural characteristic that can
be interpreted as the result of a poor regulation.
However, even in this apparently very negative configuration, one can find that the
overall effect is not bad for consumers.
We can use two main gauges to assess the global effect of the non-discrimination
rule: a normative one by comparing the levels of global surplus and consumer’s surplus,
and a practical one, by comparing the average prices.
Surplus index
• Before the constraint on price is imposed, total welfare is
WD = uma + u
m
b + u
cN =
3
4
a2 +
3
4
b2 + c (23)
Under the no-discrimination rule, total welfare becomes
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WND = uma + u
cm
b + u
cm
c =
3
4
a2 +

b2 −
c2
4

+ c (24)
We clearly have WND > WD since the regulation leaves the quantities sold un-
changed in markets a and c whereas trade increases in market b. Then from the global
point of view, in our oversimplified model, the obligation to sell at the same price in
and out of the area is a good initiative.
This first effect is an artefact due to the lack of elasticity of demand in market c.
If demand in c decreases after the price increase, the loss of surplus in c can be larger
than the gain in b and the net effect on total welfare could be reversed.
• However, Ofgem alleged that SLC 25A was implemented in the interest of con-
sumers. What can we say about their surplus?
Without the price constraint,
CSD = (uma − p
m
a q
m
a ) + (u
m
b − p
m
b q
m
b ) +

ucN − 2pNi q
N
i

=
a2
4
+
b2
4
+ c (25)
Under the non-discrimination rule, the consumers’ surplus becomes
CSND = (uma − p
m
a q
m
a ) + (u
cm
b − p
cm
b q
cm
b ) + (u
cm
c − p
cm
c q
cm
c ) =
a2
4
+

b−
c
2
2
+0 (26)
We see that the consumers’ surplus is unchanged by regulation in market a, it decreases
in market c and it increases in market b. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the
regulation has positive effects for consumers. We can compute CSD − CSND = b
2
4 +
c−

b− c2
2
, which we can rewrite as
CSD −CSND =


c

1−
c
2

−

b2
2
− bc

−

b2 − c2
4

(27)
By the second inequality in (22), the term in brackets is positive but after subtracting
b2−c2
4

> 0, the sign of CSD −CSND cannot be certified. For example if b = 1, c = 12 ,
we obtain
CSD −CSND =
3
16
(28)
whereas if b = 1, c = 13 , we obtain
CSD −CSND = −
1
9
(29)
In a nutshell, when c = 12 consumers are globally better off without the price reg-
ulation and the opposite is true when c = 13 . This is because the consumers’ surplus
in market c is fully confiscated by firm b when the latter is left alone because of the
regulation. Therefore, we have that for a “high” (resp. “low”) value of c, the non-
discrimination clause is harmful (beneficial) to consumers.18
18It is easy to check that when b = 1 the value of c that changes the sign of CSD − CSND is c ≃ .4.
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Average price The surplus index cannot be calculated without sound knowledge of
consumers’ willingness to pay. Regulators may rather use an observable index, such as
the average price p =

pq
q
. When prices are set freely, we have pmi = i, q
m
i =
i
2 on the
local markets and pNi = 0, q
N
i =
1
2 on the shared market (i = a, b) . The average price is
then
pD =
a2
2 +
b2
2
a
2 +
b
2 + 1
(30)
Under the no-discrimination clause, we have pma = a, q
m
a =
a
2 on market a, p
cm
b = c, q
m
b =
b− c2 on market b, and p
cm
b = c, q
cm
b = 1 on market c. Then the average price is
pND =
a2
2 +

b− c2

c+ c
a
2 +

b− c2

+ 1
(31)
Note first that more consumers are served under the no-discrimination requirement.
Indeed, markets a and c have the same quantity sold whereas consumption increases in
market b where the price has decreased. The denominator is then higher in pND than
in pD.
Now consider the expenditures, that is the numerator in the two average prices. In
market a, the regulation leaves consumers’ expenditures unchanged at a
2
2 . In market
b, expenditures decrease (from b
2
2 to

b− c2

c), while they increase in market c (from
0 to c). Nevertheless, taking together markets b and c, expenditures increase since this
higher revenue is the reason why firm b remained active in market c despite the price
constraint (see the second inequality in (22)). The result is that the numerator is higher
in pND than in pD.
As a consequence, pD can be larger or smaller than pND depending on the values of
the parameters a, b and c.
For example, assume that a = 2 and b = 1.
* If c = 12 ,
pD − pND = −
1
22
(32)
* If c = 13 ,
pD − pND =
4
51
(33)
which confirms the result we have obtained in terms of consumers’ surplus: when
c = 12 , consumers are better off without the price constraint and it vice-versa when
c = 13 .
The way we have measured the average price is nevertheless disputable since it
integrates consumers in market a, whereas their situation does not change when the
regulation is implemented. Note that consumers of market a are cancelled out in the
index in terms of surplus variation. If we restrict the computation of the average price
to markets b and c, we obtain
pD =
b2
2
b
2 + 1
=
1
3
(34)
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when b = 1, and
pND = c (35)
Then, we can keep the former statement that for a “high” (resp. “low”) value of c, the
no-discrimination clause is harmful (beneficial) to consumers.
The result is that one firm retreating to its home market because of price regulation,
a very negative signal in terms of competition policy, can be profitable to consumers. But
assessing whether consumers will benefit necessitates in depth knowledge of consumers’
preferences. Additionally, we must emphasize that knowledge can be insufficient as
different indexes can give opposite answers. For example, with b = 1, for 13 < c < .4,
we have that pD − pND < 0 meaning that the constraint on prices is bad for consumers
and CSD −CSND < 0 which means the opposite.
4 Conclusion
Clearly, Ofgem was not entirely certain that prohibiting spatial discrimination would
benefit consumers, since it had added a sunset clause to its regulation. By contrast,
the British economists who opposed its decision were convinced that, because it was
anti-competitive, it would harm consumers. Actually, as we have shown, even in an
oversimplified framework, it is difficult to assess ex ante whether price discrimination
is good or bad both globally and individually for each category of players: incumbents,
rivals and consumers. As Armstrong (2006) states, “Price discrimination can lead to
more intense competition which benefits consumers. When firms have difficulty com-
mitting to prices, they often are forced to charge low prices. In such situations, a policy
which forbids discrimination endows a firm with commitment power and prevents the
firm competing with itself, to the detriment of consumers and welfare.” This is precisely
what occurred in the British case. Nevertheless, Armstrong cautiously writes that price
discrimination can lead to more intense competition. It may be that competition is
not intense enough under price discrimination. As Stole (2007) writes in his in-depth
analysis of price discrimination, ”In many circumstances the theories cannot provide
definitive answers without additional empirical evidence”. We conclude that Ofgem was
not wrong since the sunset clause put a stop to a sort of market experiment, showing
that price discrimination was eventually better for consumers than was uniform pricing.
Whether econometric methods would allow one to reach the same conclusion ex ante
is by no means evident because of the structural changes that can occur when firms
are considering the possibility of quitting some market segments. If this can occur, the
changes produced by new regulatory rules can be so drastic that the data available in
the initial state of the industry are not reliable enough to evaluate the final state. Our
model shows that, even if one firm retreats to its home region letting a monopoly posi-
tion on two markets to the other, discrimination banning can be profitable to consumers.
In such cases, market experiments are welcome.
The episode also raises an institutional question that deserves deeper investigation:
is it efficient to have an industry-specific regulator authorized to curb pricing rules
in the retail market. Competition works well when it puts sellers under pressure to
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offer the best goods at the lowest prices. If they don’t, consumers will prefer to buy
elsewhere. When companies are able to limit competition, in particular in cases of abuse
of dominant position and agreements to avoid competing with each other, it is time
for competition authorities to impose fines and remedies. An energy-specific regulator
should just exert an ex ante control on the activities of natural monopolies, such as the
operators of electricity transmission and distribution networks. Consequently it should
be the role of competition authorities to monitor wholesale production and supply to
final consumers that are supposed to be competitive segments. Why to maintain an
ex ante regulator that edicts pricing rules on the retail market? Does it mean that
even when retail is open to free entry, competition is not workable? If so, it is the very
rationale for the liberalization of the energy industry that is disputable.
In its report of June 2016 on the Energy Market Investigation, CMA recommends
that Ofgem should remove a number of standard licence conditions such as the ban
on complex tariff structures, a rule limiting the number of tariffs, restrictions on the
offer of discounts, and restrictions on the offer of bundled products. This suggests that
the competition authority views any ex ante pricing limitation as counterproductive.
However, we should not forget that CMA is judge and jury in this case since there is
some form of competition in the regulation game between entities operating ex ante and
those operating ex post.
However, industry regulators often play political and social roles that are beyond
the prerogatives of competition authorities, tightly tied by international rules. This is
true in all network industries. For instance, in the perspective of competition open-
ing in the railways industry, −a politically sensitive issue− one may advocate in favor
of strengthening the regulator’s authority to implement social experiments whenever
neither theoretical models nor econometrics can suggest clear-cut ex ante remedies to
adverse effects on competition. This is quite common in real life where markets are
neither perfectly competitive nor completely monopolized. As Stole (2007, p. 2292)
writes, ”it may be frustrating that truly robust theoretical predictions are a rarity due to
the additional effects of imperfect competition on our classic price-discrimination theo-
ries”. Whenever theory cannot provide definitive answers without additional empirical
evidence, since empirical evidence can only be collected ex post, social experiment or-
ganized by the sector regulator can be an efficient solution.
19
References
[1] Armstrong M. (2006), “Price Discrimination”, chapter 12 in P. Buc-
cirossi (Ed) (2008), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, MIT Press
else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/222.pdf
[2] Bester, H. E. Petrakis (1996), “Coupons and Oligopolistic Price Discrimination,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 227-242.
[3] Cooper J.C., L. Froeb, D.P. O’Brien and S. Tschantz (2005) “Does price discrim-
ination intensify competition? Implications for antitrust”, Antitrust Law Journal,
Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 327-373
[4] Corts, K. (1998), “Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Com-
petition and Strategic Commitment”, Rand Journal of Economics 29, 306-323.
[5] Dobson, P. and M. Waterson (2005) “Chain-Store Pricing Across Local Markets”,
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. March, Vol. 14 Issue 1, p.93-119
[6] Hviid, M. andWaddams Price, C. (2012), “Non-discrimination Clauses in the Retail
Energy Sector”, The Economic Journal, Volume 122, Issue 562, pages F236—F252,
August
[7] Levine M.E. (2002), “Price discrimination without market power”, Yale Journal on
Regulation, 19(1), 2002, 1-36.
[8] Littlechild, S (2012), “Ofgem and the Philosopher’s Stone”,
www.iea.org.uk/blog/ofgem-and-the-philosophers-stone.
[9] Littlechild, S (2014), “Promoting or restricting competition?: Regulation of
the UK retail residential energy market since 2008”, EPRG Working Paper
1415, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics, www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/1415-PDF.pdf
[10] Pollitt, M G and A B Haney (2014), “Dismantling a Competitive Retail Electricity
Market: Residential Market Reforms in Great Britain”, Electricity Journal, 27 (1),
January: 66-73.
[11] Stole, L. (2007), “Price Discrimination and Competition”, in M. Armstrong and
R. Porter (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Economics vol. III, North-Holland
[12] Thisse J.F and X. Vives (1988), “On The Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy”,
The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 1., March: 122-137.
[13] Waddams C., D. Deller, M. Giulietti, J. Young Jeon, G. Loomes,
A. Moniche (2012), ”Who Switched at ‘The Big Switch’ and Why?”,
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia,
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8194340/Big+Switch+-
+Results.pdf/2e01588d-6564-4e28-b06d-233eaad389c4
20
[14] Waddams Price C. and M. Zhu (2016), Non-discrimination clauses: their effect on
GB retail energy prices”, The Energy Journal, vol. 37 n◦2, 111-132.
21
